A Wild Surmise
There is a consensus that beauty in the natural world is given, along with the proper human response to it; that it is a settled matter; that it will take care of itself. And this worries me, since I am cursed to worry about the wrong things. Maybe, since I want to draw out the experience of beauty, to make it linger, to pin the proverbial butterfly to the card; and since there is nothing to say about how it does work; I want to understand instead how it doesn’t work, how it is perverse or unreliable, how it goes astray.
To know this better, my course of reading over the summer focused on nature writing, taking me through a few evergreens on landscape architecture reading lists that I had never got to before – Annie Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, E.O. Wilson’s Biophilia – along with one outlier, a collected edition of Audubon’s writings. If Dillard and Wilson each stand up for the standard account of nature – a fragile cosmos to look into with rapt attention – Audubon does something altogether stranger. He sets off down the Ohio and Mississippi, and on his way makes like the old saw about the army – travels the world, meets interesting birds, and shoots them. He marvels at clouds of passenger pigeons, and shoots them; marvels at tender bird mothers, and shoots them; sees birds unknown to Western eyes, and shoots them. From the scenes he meets with in New Orleans, where the market is full of dead grebes, pelicans, and anhingas, it seems that plenty of others were enjoying the turkey shoot as well.
We can contrast his conduct with that of his predecessor, Gilbert White of Selbourne, who would shoot a swift or a swallow if he had to settle a question but was just as happy to only watch and write. But then, Audubon did not have a living from the Church of England, like White did; he had already lost one income and needed another to feed his family; or rather, he wanted another to make his fortune. And so he had to shoot as much as he could, to draw as much as he could, to serve a new audience who would pay for knowledge of new birds. We profit today from his scheme in uncomfortable ways.
Elsewhere, we see Audubon experiment with tagging birds to better know their movements, and we approve of his better angel; our default assumption is that he didn’t know any better, that he could not have foreseen the consequences, that he thought he was traveling in a providential land of Cockaigne. We might picture a perfected Audubon of the late 20th century, shorn of his rifle, an Audubon who would never pity himself for having lost his slaves to bankruptcy. But it is hard not to take from recent history that there is no path of progress set out already, for us to all diligently help each other along; but instead a series of fluctuating states ahead, arrayed upon very uncertain trend lines, each one refusing to follow the last one’s trajectory. We may yet live to see every covenant over ivory or pangolin scales forgotten, and find ever rarer animals hoarded and coveted in ever more grotesque ways.
This is all to say that an automatic respect for nature of the kind that Wilson advocated is no necessary end. Our relationships with beauty therein are not given, but contingent; the rarity and elusiveness of an animal gives rise to the bloodless way in which we value it, and could as easily give rise to an entirely different way of relating to it were something else in the equation to change.
Here’s another form of the same problem. I have been following along in Susanne Langer’s Feeling and Form, where she makes the case that the main point of art is to give form to the unsayable movements of the self – that people can recognize in the system of choices inscribed in art an analogue to the experience of being human. They find value in a form that is not a straightforward representation of a human self, but what she calls a semblance, something radiating a recognizable subjectivity that is not directly representable. In a similar way, a person well-advanced in chess can read a particular form of subjectivity in a human’s chess game; but will be dismayed in reading the moves of an AI, a thing that does not play according to human logic, conventions, or preferences.
You can imagine that an AI trained on visual preference surveys could equally select, or create, images of landscape that technically delivered on the criteria while being nonetheless alienating, in that they disregarded certain unremarked base conditions – just as a chess AI disregards both the desire to be social, to play against another mind, or for an audience, as well as the desire to amuse yourself, to fall into a lineage, to try things, to prove them for yourself.
This would not necessarily be about better training the AI, only because the production and valuation of images is part of a social system. That is to say, considered in a society beauty is not only the appeal to whatever accident of genetic history, but a move within a social game — Langer’s recognition depends on knowing a series of codes and reading art according to them. If people construct beauty out of the material of nature, they do so according to a series of changing protocols to be recognized. Above and beyond base preferences there is an unlimited work of scaffolding and erosion, like a cliff-dwelling society busy building itself into rock.
Any aesthetic appreciation of nature travels through social circuits to complete an impression – witness how animals get plucked out of context to serve as parts of social arrangements. When I was a child a sloth was a minor, faraway animal, something you wouldn’t know if you saw it; suddenly, it gained currency in my social milieu, and so it takes a place in t‑shirts and greeting cards and children’s books, and people in the United States will now travel to reserves in Costa Rica just to take pictures of them. In that context, an image of a sloth is not a self-explanatory appeal to instinct; nor does it prompt a simple instinctual response.
An unscientific survey of the settled imperial cultures reveals a progression of preferred landscapes from the ancestral savanna that E.O. Wilson held up as the durable type of landscape beauty – with the flower garden, the beach, the mountain path, the ski slope, all added alongside. What more remains to be added – or subtracted? How does the state of the everyday landscape push us to one, or the other? And how do our activities mesh with these landscapes to turn the machine of change still a little more?